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Federal Sentencing Guidelines
by Andrea Wilson*
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1984, Congress mandated the creation of the United States
Sentencing Commission composed of presidential appointees to create
guidelines for a comprehensive sentencing scheme.' As a result, the
United States Sentencing Guidelines ("U.S.S.G.")2 have been in effect
since November 1, 1987, and apply to all federal criminal offenses
committed since that date.
In principle, guideline sentencing should be simple. Courts should
arrive at a sentencing range using calculations that first consider the
criminal conduct being sentenced and then the criminal history of the
offender. In practice, however, the guidelines are difficult to understand,
impossible to apply evenhandedly, and frequently difficult to predict.
Hundreds of changes have added to the confusion. As a result,
sentencing guidelines appeals now comprise the bulk of the caseload of
the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.
The offense conduct side of the equation considers the defendant's
actual criminal conduct along with adjustments based upon the
defendant's role in the offense, acceptance of responsibility, and
obstruction ofjustice. The most complicated concept is the consideration
of conduct which is outside the charged offense, but still factored as

* Assistant Federal Public Defender, Middle District of Florida, Tampa Division; former
Assistant Public Defender, Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, Tampa, Florida; Defender Services
liaison to the United States Sentencing Commission; 1991; Faculty: Orientation Seminar
for Assistant Federal Defenders, National Defense Investigators Association, sentencing
guideline training for court appointed panels in various districts. Florida State University
(J.D., 1981; B.S., 1978). Member, The Florida Bar; Member, United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida; Member, Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.
1. 28 U.S.C. § 994(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
2. United States Sentencing Guidelines [hereinafter U.S.S.G.J.
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"relevant conduct."3 Despite several overhauls,4 U.S.S.G. section 1B1.3
is still impossible to apply consistently.
Criminal history calculations, though less complicated than those for
offense conduct, remain difficult. Courts must weight prior convictions
based on the prior sentence, recency, and other factors. Designations
like Career Offender' and Armed Career Criminal6 boost the sentence
range to at or near the statutory maximum for the offense sentenced.7
Yearly amendments have resulted in over five hundred changes in
sentencing law. Usually in May, the United States Sentencing
Commission writes guideline amendments and submits them for
congressional approval. Congress can reject amendments, alter them, or
take no action. Historically, Congress takes the latter course and the
amendments automatically become effective the following November 1.
In 1994, facing challenges to its quorum, the Commission passed only
six material amendments during the ordinary amendment cycle (a record
low).' An emergency amendment prompted by the Violent Crime
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994' exempts first offenders from
the application of mandatory minimum sentences.'"
Two Supreme Court opinions affect guideline sentencing this term. In
Nichols v. United States," the Court held that uncounselled misdemeanors which did not result in sentences of incarceration can nevertheless be used to calculate criminal history."
In Custis v. United
States" the court held that there is no right to collaterally attack prior
state convictions in federal sentencing proceedings under the Armed
Career Criminal Act, 14 except for prior convictions that were obtained
in violation of the defendant's right to counsel.'5 The Supreme Court

3. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3.

4. See U.S.S.G. amend. 439, effective November 1, 1992, and U.S.S.G. amend. 503,
effective November 1, 1994.
5. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1.
6. Id. § 4B1.4.
7.

Id. §§ 4B1.1, 4B1.4(a).

8.

Several commissioners were sitting beyond the expiration of their terms and new

commissioners were not yet appointed. Because it was understood during the 1994

cycle

that the defense bar would attack controversial amendments, those passed were promoted
as defense-oriented.

9. Pub. L. No. 103-322 (1994).
10.

Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, § 80001(b) (1994) (codified

as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
11. 114 S. Ct. 1921 (1994).
12. Id. at 1923.
13. 114 S.Ct. 1732 (1994).
14. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (1988).
15.

114 S. Ct. at 1735-37.
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hinted that defendants might attack the constitutionality of prior
convictions on other grounds through habeas corpus actions."6
The Eleventh Circuit often takes a progovernment approach when
resolving sentencing questions. For instance, the court has held that
written waivers of the right to appeal can be enforced, even though a
defendant could not have known what his sentence would be at the time
he agreed to the waiver."
II.
A.

1994 AMENDMENTS

Section 1B1.3: Relevant Conduct

The concept of relevant conduct generates enormous discrepancy in
federal sentencing, largely because the terms in the guideline are vague
and difficult to apply. The Commission issued two revisions in 1994.18
1. Jointly Undertaken Activity. The Commission attempted to
clarify the term "jointly undertaken activity" by adding that relevant
conduct does not include the activity of members of a conspiracy
occurring before the defendant joined (even if the defendant was aware
of the conduct).19 However, the modification allows the inclusion of this
conduct if "some unusual set of circumstances" warrants a departure.2 0
2. Same Course of Conduct. The Commission revised Application
Note 9 to U.S.S.G. section 1B1.3, which lists factors used to determine
when multiple offenses constitute the "same course of conduct," and
therefore, are included in relevant conduct, to permit the court to
consider "the degree of similarity of the offenses, the regularity
(repetitions) of the offense, and the time interval between the offenses."21 Incorporating language from a Ninth Circuit case,' the amendment states that:
[w]hen one of the above factors is absent, a stronger presence of at
least one of the other factors is required. For example, where the
conduct alleged to be relevant is relatively remote to the offense of

16.

Id. at 1737-38.

17. United States v. Bushert, 997 F.2d 1343, 1345 (11th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115
S. Ct. 652 (1994).
18. See U.S.S.G. amend. 503 (Nov. 1, 1994).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22.

United States v. Hahn, 960 F.2d 903 (9th Cir. 1992).

1398

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

conviction, a stronger showing of similarity or regularity is necessary
to compensate for the absence of temporal proximity.2
B. Section 1BZ.10 (policy statement): Retroactivity of Amended
Guideline Range
When a court resentences a defendant because of a favorable change
in the guidelines, it must recalculate only the amended guideline,
leaving other calculations unchanged.2' For example, a defendant
resentenced because of the new. method of calculating the weight of
LSD' will not be able to benefit from the additional reduction for
acceptance of responsibility.2" The Eleventh Circuit previously adopted
the "One Book Rule."27 This amendment seems to overturn that rule.
Section 2D1.1: Drug Quantity Table
The amendment lowers the highest base offense level to thirty-eight
instead of forty-two. A departure, however, is authorized if the quantity
of drugs is at least ten times that required for level thirty-eight."
C.

D. Section 4B1.1: CareerOffenders
The amendment clarifies the term "offense statutory maximum," used
to determine the base offense level to mean the statutory maximum
before the application of any enhancements based on prior record.'
E. Section 5G1.2: Sentencing on Multiple Counts
Multiple terms of supervised release run concurrently even though the
statute
may require the terms of incarceration to be served consecutive30
ly.
F Section 5G2.0 (policy statement) and Section 5H: Grounds for
Departure
The Commission has added a departure based on a combination of
offender characteristics which by themselves would not ordinarily be

23. See U.S.S.G. amend. 503 (Nov. 1, 1994).
24. See U.S.S.G. amend. 504 (Nov. 1, 1994).
25. See U.S.S.G. amend. 488 (Nov. 1, 1993).
26. See U.S.S.G. amend. 459 (Nov. 1, 1992).

27. United States v. Lance, 23 F.3d 343, 344 (11th Cir. 1994). Sentences are calculated
using the more lenient of the guidelines in effect at the time of the offense or at the time
of sentencing. Id. at 344.

28. See U.S.S.G. amend. 505 (Nov. 1, 1994).
29. See U.S.S.G. amend. 506 (Nov. 1, 1994).
30.

See U.S.S.G. amend. 507 (Nov. 1, 1994).
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in an unusual degree, but
relevant, if these factors are present
3
departures should be "extremely rare." '
III.

THE ViOLENT CRIME CONTROL & LAW ENFORCEMENT ACT OF

1994
The 1994 Crime
effective since September, radically changed
criminal
law. It created nearly sixty new federal crimes
punishable by
the death penalty and increased the existing penalties for dozens of
other offenses.' The Commission reacted immediately to a mandate
in the bill by creating a guideline to address the "Safety Valve" provision.'
The crime bill contains several major revisions particularly
relevant to guideline sentencing.
Bill,32

A. Three Strikes, You're Out-MandatoryLife Sentences for Certain
Vwlent Felons
A defendant convicted of a "serious violent felony" and who has
sustained at least two previous violent felony convictions, or one serious
violent felony conviction and one serious drug offense conviction (as long
as each prior conviction was "committed after the defendant's conviction
of the preceding' offense) shall be sentenced to life imprisonment.M
The term "serious violent felony" is predictably comprehensive. It
includes carjacking, extortion, arson, and firearms use, as well as certain
assaults and attempts or conspiracies to commit these offenses.3 7 Also
included are offenses punishable by ten years or more involving "the use,
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of
another or that, by [their] nature, [involve] a substantial risk that
physical force against the person of another may be used in the course
of committing the offense.'
The law exempts some felonies including
certain robberies and arson, 9 but the definitions are vague. For
example, the term excludes arson "if the defendant establishes by clear

31. See U.S.S.G. amend. 508 (Nov. 1, 1994).
32. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, § 80001(b) (1994) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).

33. Id.
34. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988).
35.
36.
37.

Id. § 3559(cXl) (Supp. VI 1994).
Id.
Id. § 3559(c)(2)(FXi).

38. Id. § 3559(c)(2)(FXii).
39. Id. § 3559(cX3).
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and convincing evidence that.., the offense posed no threat to human
life .... '
Three Strikes enhancement requires an information filed by the
United States Attorney pursuant to Title 21, Section 51(a) of the United
States Code ("U.S.C."). 41 Otherwise, the guidelines apply without the

mandatory life sentence (although virtually any offender who qualifies
for this provision will be a career offender under U.S.S.G. section
4B1.142 or an Armed Career Criminal under U.S.S.G. section
4B1.4 43)." A predicate conviction overturned because of actual
innocence requires resentencing without the enhancement.'
B. Relief for Elderly Long-Term Inmates
The Bureau of Prisons can release any inmate who is at least seventy
years old and who has served at least thirty years in prison for the
current offense if the Bureau determines that the inmate is not a danger
to any person or the community.46 This change will not affect the
sentencing guidelines but reflects the growing number of inmates
serving mandatory life sentences and the long-term problems an aging
prison population poses.
C. The Safety Valve: Relief for First-7Tme Offenders Facing
MandatoryMinimum Sentences in Drug Cases
Mandatory drug sentences can be waived under certain circumstances
for first offenders. The sentencing court must give the government an
opportunity to make a recommendation and must make certain
findings:47
1. The defendant has no more than one criminal history point as
calculated under the sentencing guidelines;'
2. "The defendant did not use violence or credible threats of violence
or possess a firearm or other dangerous weapon' nor cause another
defendant to do so; °

40. Id. § 3559(c)(3)(B)-(B)(i).
41. 21 U.S.C. § 851(a) (1988).

42. U.S.S.G § 4Bl.I.
43.
44.

Id. § 4B1.4.
18 U.S.C. § 3559(c)(4).

45, Id. § 3559(c)(7).
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (Supp. VI 1994).
Id. § 3553(f).
Id. § 3553(f)(1).
Id. § 3533(f)(2).

50. Id.
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3. The offense did not involve death or serious bodily injury;5'
4.
"The defendant was not an organizer, leader, manager, or
supervisor" 5 2 as those terms are used in the sentencing guidelines,"3
and did not engage in a continuing criminal enterprise;"
5. The defendant truthfully provides all pertinent information
regarding the offense to the government at a time no later than
sentencing. 5
Obviously, this provision is full of potential loopholes. For instance,
though the government is compelled to listen to the defendant,6 it may
be impossible to persuade the government of the defendant's truthfulness. Similarly, terms like leader, organizer, and credible threats of
violence, most of which are imported from the guidelines, will spawn a
whole new generation of challenges.
Congress required the Sentencing Commission to implement this
provision, requiring that the lowest term of imprisonment be at least
twenty-four months in a case which otherwise would call for a five-year
mandatory minimum. 7 The Commission added a new guideline
effective September 23, 1994.8 It eliminates the mandatory minimum,
but the sentencing ranges, which are driven by the mandatory sentences,
remain the same. 9
IV.

1994 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT CASES

ChapterOne

A.

Although other circuits had already adopted the "one book rule,' ° the
Eleventh Circuit held for the first time that "district courts may not use
sections from different versions of the Guidelines but must use one

51.

Id. § 3553(f)(3).

52. Id. § 3553(f)(4).
53. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1.
54.

18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(4). See 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1988).

55.

18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(5).

56. Id. § 3553(f)(5).
57.

Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, § 80001(b) (1994) (codified

as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
58. U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2.
59. Id.
60. See United States v. Boula, 997 F.2d 263 (7th Cir. 1993); United States v. Warren,
980 F.2d 1300 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 397, 126 (1993); United States v.
Lenfesty, 923 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 968 (1991); United States
v. Stephenson,921 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1990).
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version of the Guidelines in its entirety."1 This Article previously
discussed how a 1994 amendment might affect that holding. 2
1. Section 1B: Relevant Conduct. The determination of relevant
conduct is fact-specific by nature. In United States v. Chitty, the court
restated the test which determines whether a defendant should be held
accountable for the acts of co-conspirators:6' "A conspirator is responsible for conspiracy activities in which he is involved, and for drugs
involved in those activities, and for subsequent acts and conduct of coconspirators, and drugs involved in those acts or conduct, that are in
furtherance of the conspiracy and are reasonably foreseeable to him."6"
Chitty rented a house on a large farm and allowed the house to be
used to stash one shipment of marijuana for one night in 1987.
Although his co-conspirators continued to import marijuana by air,
dropping it over farm land just as he had, Chitty was not aware of any
continuing drug activity. ' The court found that only the amount of
marijuana that Chitty was directly involved with (the only marijuana of
which he was aware) could be used against him in determining the
appropriate guideline range." This ruling also affected the statutory
sentence since the smaller quantity of marijuana no longer triggered an
enhanced mandatory minimum sentence. 7
In United States v. Maxwell, ' the defendant had been convicted of
conspiracy to distribute dilaudid and distribution of less than one ounce
of cocaine (which had been sold in place of dilaudid when that substance
was unavailable)."9 The district court sentenced him based on the
dilaudid, the cocaine, and an additional amount of cocaine that a witness
said he had sold for Maxwell at a different time apart from the
conspiracy.70 The court found error in including the additional cocaine
because it forced an overbroad definition of relevant conduct.71 The
court adopted the tests of two other circuits, holding that "'When illegal
conduct ... [exists] in "discrete, identifiable units" apart from the

61.
62.
63.
64.
United
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Lance, 23 F.3d at 344.
See supra note 18.
15 F.3d 159 (11th Cir. 1994).
Id. at 162 (citing United States v. Beasley, 2 F.3d 1551, 1561 (11th Cir. 1993);
States v. Ismond, 993 F.2d 1498, 1499 (11th Cir. 1993)).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 162-63.
34 F.3d 1006 (11th Cir. 1994).
Id. at 1008-09.
Id. at 1010.
Id at 1011.'
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offense of conviction, the Guidelines anticipate a separate charge for
such conduct,'" 72 thus requiring sentencing courts to study the "'similarity, regularity, and temporal proximity' between the offense of
conviction and the uncharged conduct." 3 Following the Seventh and
Ninth Circuits, the Eleventh Circuit requires sentencing courts to
consider "'whether there are distinctive similarities between the offense
of conviction and the remote conduct that signal that they are part of a
single course of conduct rather than isolated, unrelated events that
happen only to be similar in kind.'"
B.

Chapter Two: Specific Offense Guidelines

1. Section 2B3.1: Robbery. A two level enhancement applies "if
any person was physically restrained to facilitate commission of the
offense or to facilitate escape."7 5 In United States v. Jones,76 the
defendant and his accomplices forced bank employees into a safe room
and ordered them to lie down. The defendants closed the door and left.
The defendant argued that there had been no physical restraint,
presumably since he had not physically touched the victims. 7 7 The
court held that the enhancement was properly applied because the
presence of handguns forced the victims to comply just as though they
had been tied or locked up.7 The court noted that "Jones and his
accomplices restricted their victims' mobility and capacity to observe
events [in order] to facilitate the robbery."7 9
A discussion of the "heartland"' of bank robberies exists in the two
1 The court found
opinions the court issued in United States v. Omar."
that the number of robbers involved (in this case, four) as well as the
number and kind of firearms they carried (three were armed, one with

72. Id. at 1010-11 (citing United States v. Hahn, 960 F.2d 903, 909 (9th Cir. 1992)).
73. Id. at 1011 (citing United States v. Sykes, 7 F.3d 1331, 1335 (7th Cir. 1993)).
74. Id. (citing Hahn, 960 F.2d at 909-10).
75. U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B). Physical restraint is defined as "the forcible restraint of
the victim such as by being tied, bound, or locked up." Id. § 1B1.1 (application
instructions).
76. 32 F.3d 1512 (11th Cir. 1994).
77. Id. at 1518-19.
78. Id. at 1519.
79. Id.
80. U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt A, intro. comt. 4(b) states that "the Commission intends the
sentencing courts to treat each guideline as carving out a 'heartland,' a set of typical cases."
A case outside the heartland may warrant a departure. Id.
81. 24 F.3d 1356 (11th Cir. 1994), modifying, United States v. Lnu, 16 F.3d 1168 (11th
Cir. 1994). The cases refer to the same defendant. "Lnu" is usually a contraction of "last
name unknown" and the Court probably decided to use the name "Omar" instead.
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an Uzi) constitute factors outside the heartland and can justify an
upward departure.8 2 On the other hand, death threats to an assistant
manager and the public danger of a daytime bank robbery constitute
83
factors which are not atypical and cannot sustain a departure.

2. Section 2C1.1: Offering, Giving, Soliciting, or Receiving a
Bribe; Extortion Under Color of Official Right. This guideline
calls for an eight level enhancement if the official being bribed occupies
a "high-level decision-making or sensitive position."' In United States
v. Lazarre,' the defendant (an activist working on behalf of detained
Haitian immigrants) attempted to bribe an Immigration and Naturalization Service assistant district director who reported the crime to the
Justice Department and cooperated. 86 The assistant district director
possessed discretion to review detainees for parole eligibility and set
bond for those who were eligible. 7 The court analogized his authority
to that envisioned by the enhancement:
[The assistant district director's] discretion is similar to that given a
supervisory law enforcement official or a prosecuting attorney or even
a judge setting bail. Each of those officials must work within certain
confines. They are guided by specific policies and are restrained to a
degree by rules and regulations. But these jobs involve the exercise of
substantial discretion; and each enjoys sufficient autonomy to
implement established guidelines and make substantive decisions
based on the unique circumstances of individual cases."

3.

Section 2D1.1:

Unlawful Manufacturing, Importing,

Exporting, or Trafficking (Including Possession with Intent to
Commit These Offenses); Attempt or Conspiracy
a. Section 2D1.1(c): Definition of "CocaineBase." The statute which
provides a much harsher penalty for the importation of cocaine base
than for cocaine hydrochloride does not define the term "cocaine
base."89 The guideline provision, U.S.S.G. section 2D1.1(c), 90 does
define the term. In 1993 the guideline was amended to read: "'Cocaine

82.

24 F.3d at 1357.

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Lnu, 16 F.3d at 1170-71.
U.S.S.G. § 2C0.I(bX2)(B).
14 F.3d 580 (llth Cir. 1994).
Id. at 581.
Id. at 581-82.
Id. at 582.
21 U.S.C. §§ 952(a), 960(b) (1988).
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c) (definitions following drug quantity table).
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base,' for the purposes of this guideline, means 'crack.' 'Crack' is the
street name for a form of cocaine base, usually prepared by processing
cocaine hydrochloride and sodium bicarbonate, and usually appearing in
a lumpy, rocklike form."9 1
In United States v. Munoz-Realpe,92 the defendant was convicted of
importing ".. . 'cocaine base in a liquid form,' which could not be used
without further processing .. . .9' The government argued that even
if the substance failed the guideline definition, it was still cocaine base
for purposes of the statutory mandatory minimum sentence. 94 The
defendant argued that the substance was not cocaine base either under
the statute or the guidelines.9 5 The court held, in an unprecedented
merging of the guidelines and the United States Code, that the guideline
definition applies, and therefore the "cocaine base in liquid form" was
not really cocaine base under the statute.N The court reasoned that
because Congress approves the guidelines and amendments to them,
Congress approved the guideline's definition of cocaine base, since
"tihere is no reason ... to assume that Congress meant for 'cocaine
base' to have more than one definition."97
However, because the 1993 amendment is substantive rather than
clarifying," it cannot be applied retroactively. In United States v.
Camacho,9 the defendant was convicted of smuggling liquid cocaine
(not crack) which had been painted onto place mats."gg Although
Camacho was sentenced before the amendment became effective, he
argued that it should be applied to him on appeal under the rule stated
earlier in United States v. Howard.' Camacho lost.'02
b. Determinationof Drug Quantity. When sentencing drug conspirators in United States v. Bush,"3 the court reiterated the two step
process which must be employed:

91. Id.
92. 21 F.3d 375 (11th Cir. 1994).
93. Id. at 376.
94. Id. at 377.
95. Id. at 376.
96. Id. at 376-77.
97. Id. at 378.
98. U.S.S.G. amend. 187 (1993).
99. 40 F.3d 349 (l1th Cir. 1994).
100. Id. at 351.
101. Id. at 354 (citing United States v. Howard 923 F.2d 1500, 1504 (lth Cir. 1991)).
The appellate court will consider intervening clarifying amendments even though they were
not in effect at the time of sentencing. Id.
102. Id. at 355.
103. 28 F.3d 1084 (11th Cir. 1994).
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To determine the quantity of drugs attributable to a defendant for
sentencing purposes, the district court must first make individualized
findings concerning the scope of criminal activity undertaken by the

defendant. The court is then to determine the quantity of drugs
reasonably foreseeable in connection with that level of participation.' 04
Ambiguity in the presentence report and factual findings regarding
drug quantity can result in a remand for further determinations. In
United States v. Perez-Tosta,' the presentence report attributed the
entire quantity of the cocaine conspiracy to the defendant Rojas, but
added that it was "doubtful that the defendant realized the quantity of
contraband he was transporting ... ."'0 The sentencing court made
no specific findings (nor did counsel for the defendant ask for an
individualized determination), and the appellate court found an
insufficient factual basis for the quantity used in Rojas' calculation.0 7
4. Section 2F1.1. Fraud and Deceit. U.S.S.G. section 2F1.I(b)(3)(B) 0 8 mandates a two level enhancement if the crime violates any
judicial order, etc.'09 In a fraud involving the defendant's concealment
of assets during bankruptcy,"0 violation of a judicial order is presumed
even though no specific order has been entered."'
5. Section 2X3.1: (Accessory After the Fact). U.S.S.G. section
2C1.1, bribery, extortion," 2 cross references the guideline for Accessory
After the Fact if the "offense was committed for the purpose of concealing, or obstructing justice in respect to another criminal offense." s
U.S.S.G. section 2X3.1P 4 is essentially an enhancement which applies
when "the offense involved obstructing the investigation or prosecution

104. Id. at 1087 (citing United States v. Beasley, 2 F.3d 1551, 1561 (11th Cir. 1993),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2751 (1994)).
105. 36 F.3d 1552 (11th Cir. 1994).
106. Id. at 1564.
107. Id.
108. U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b)(3)(B).
109. Id.
110, 18 U.S.C. § 152 (Supp. VI 1994).
111. United States v. Bellew, 35 F.3d 518, 520 (11th Cir. 1994). The forms a
bankruptcy petitioner files are tantamount to judicial orders. Id. at 520.
112, U.S.S.G. § 2C1.1 Offering, Giving, Soliciting, or Receiving a Bribe; Extortion
Under Color of Law.
113. Id. § 2C1.1(c)(2).
114. Id. § 2X3.1(1).
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of a criminal offense .... .n" In United States v. Pompey11 6 the court
upheld the application of this enhancement even though the underlying
offense was a state prosecution." 7
6. Section 2S1.1(a)(1): Money Laundering and Monetary
Transaction Reporting. Following the Second Circuit,1 the court
held that U.S.S.G. section 2S1.1(a)(1)," 9 with its base offense level of
twenty-three, applies to both substantive convictions under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1956(a)(1)(A)' 20 and conspiracies to violate that subsection. 121 The
defendant argued that the conspiracy for which she was convicted
carried a base offense level of twenty since it was not a substantive
offense.122

C.

Chapter Three
In United States v. Alpert,"2 a fractured appellate court found no
obstruction of justice.1 2 The defendants, while engaging in preindictment plea negotiations, left town without contacting their attorneys or
leaving a forwarding address.1 25 Months later they were found in
California using false identities and continuing to commit the same type
of fraud for which they were ultimately convicted.1 26 The majority
held that the "U.S.S.G. Section 3C1.1 enhancement does not apply to
persons engaged in criminal activity who learn of an investigation into
that activity and simply disappear to avoid arrest, without more." 27
The court did not preclude enhancement for obstruction of justice, but
instead, remanded the case for more precise findings in the district
128

court.

115. Id.
116. 17 F.3d 351 (11th Cir. 1994).
117. Id. at 353-54. The defendant bribed a DEA agent to fix a state prosecution of the
defendant's son. Eventually the defendant, his son, and accomplices were indicted federally
and the defendant pled guilty to the bribery charge. Id. at 352.
118. United States v. Restrepo, 936 F.2d 661, 665 (2d Cir. 1991).
119. U.S.S.G § 2SI.I(B)(1).
120. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(aXl)(A) (1988).
121. United States v. Acanda, 19 F.3d 616, 619 (11th Cir. 1994).
122. Id.
123. 28 F.3d 1104 (11th Cir. 1994).
124. Id. at 1107.
125. Id. at 1106.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1107.
128. Id. at 1108.
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The defendant in United States v. McConaghy29 argued that U.S.S.G. section 3E1.1, 30 which provides an additional base offense level
reduction if the defendant "timely [notifies] authorities of his intention
to enter a plea of guilty, thereby permitting the government to avoid
preparing for trial and permitting the court to allocate its resources
efficiently . . ."' is unconstitutional. 32 He suggested that forcing
a speedy plea violated his right to effective assistance of counsel" by
preventing thorough investigation and thoughtful preparation.1 4 The
court found that "not every burden on the exercise of a constitutional
right and not every encouragement to waive such a right is invalid," 13 5
and found the guideline constitutional on its face.'
The government argued that whether the government has begun to
prepare for trial determines timeliness of the notice. 7 The court
refused to define a bright line rule, noting that the government could
interview just one witness many weeks before trial and effectively
preclude the application of the guideline in almost every case, or defense
counsel could become ill and fail to investigate, depriving the defendant
of the benefit of the guideline.'" The district court had not addressed
the timeliness of McConaghy's notification of his intention to plead and
the court remanded the case for. further findings of fact. 3 Clearly, the
issue of timeliness differs case by case, 4" and appellate courts will
review district courts' findings only for clear error."
In United States v. Pace,'42 the court held that using marijuana a
few days before pleading guilty demonstrates a lack of acceptance of
responsibility.'"
The defendant argued that since the guideline
44
requires only that a defendant accept responsibility "for his offense,"
other criminal activity not related to the offense of conviction (using

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

23 F.3d 351 (11th Cir. 1994).
U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 (1992).
23 F.3d at 352 n.1.
Id. at 352.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
23 F.3d at 352-53.
Id. (quoting Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 219 (1978)).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 353-54.
Id. at 354.
Id. at 353.
Id. at 352 (citing United States v. Rodriguez, 959 F.2d 193 (11th Cir. 1992)).
17 F.3d 341 (11th Cir. 1994).
Id. at 343.
U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a).
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drugs) should not deprive him of credit under the guideline.145 The
court disagreed, acknowledging a split among the circuits.'
D.

ChapterFour: CriminalHistory

1. Section 4B1.2: Career Offender. In determining whether a
prior conviction is a "controlled substance offense" as that term is used
in the guidelines, 47 district courts must look only at the elements of
the offense and not at the facts underlying the conviction.'
The court
had previously applied this rule when determining whether a prior
conviction was a "crime of violence" and for the first time extended it to
controlled substance offenses as well.14
2. Section 4B1.4: Armed Career Criminal. The Supreme Court
held that the crime of felon in possession of a firearm is not a violent
felony for purposes of the career offender enhancement under U.S.S.G.
section 4Bl.1.Iso The Eleventh Circuit extended that premise and held
that felon in possession is not a violent felony for purposes of the
sentencing enhancement mandated by Title 18, Section 924(e) of the
United States 2 Code15' or the guideline enhancement in U.S.S.G.
section 4B4.1.11
E. Chapter Five: Implementation of Sentence and Departures
1. Notice. In Burns v. United States,"3 the Supreme Court held
that the district court could not impose an upward departure from the
guidelines without "reasonable notice that it is contemplating [a
departure] ... on a ground not identified as a ground for upward
departure either in the presentence report or in a prehearing submission
by the Government."1 " In United States v. Valentine,'55 the govern-

145. 17 F.3d at 343.
146. Id. See United States v. Watkins, 911 F.2d 983 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v.
Morrison, 983 F.2d 730 (6th Cir. 1993).
147. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(2).
148. United States v. Lipsey, 40 F.3d 1200, 1201-02 (11th Cir. 1994).
149. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 911 F.2d 542,547 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
500 U.S. 933, (1991).
150. Stinson v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1913, 1920 (1993); U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1.
151. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (Supp. 1994).
152. United States v. Stinson, 30 F.3d 121, 122 (11th Cir. 1994).
153. 501 U.S. 129 (1991).
154. Id. at 138.
155. 21 F.3d 395 (11th Cir. 1994).
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ment filed a motion for an upward departure based on factors it
considered "atypical."l"" The district court rejected the reasons given
by the government, including one the government added at sentencing,
and departed instead based on a reason enunciated by the court for the
first time at the sentencing hearing.'5 7 The Eleventh Circuit rejected
the departure, holding that contemporaneous notice is insufficient and
advance notice is required. 158
5 9 instructs
2. Departures. The holding in United States v. Baker"
district courts to fully articulate the reasons for downward departures
or suffer a remand for that purpose.160 In United States v. Chavarria6 ' the government filed a motion for a substantial assistance
Herrara,'
departure under U.S.S.G. section 5K1.1 6 2 and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(b).' The district court departed far below the level
recommended by the government and the government appealed.'E4
The defendant objected that the government had no authority to appeal
a sentence reduced under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(b) but
the Eleventh Circuit held otherwise, 6 5 noting a split among the circuits.'" The court next determined that Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 35(b) permits a reduction only for substantial assistance, and
since 67
the district court relied on other reasons, the court remanded the
case.1
United States v. Aponte,"e a very confusing opinion, also concerns
substantial assistance departures from minimum mandatory sentences.
Aponte pleaded guilty to use of a firearm during the commission of a
drug trafficking conspiracy and faced a mandatory minimum sen-

156. Id. at 396-97.
157. Id. at 397.
158. Id. at 398.
159. 19 F.3d 605 (11th. Cir. 1994).
160. Id. at 616.
161. 15 F.3d 1033 (11th Cir. 1994).
162. U.S.S.G. § 5KI.1.
163. FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(b) which permits reduction of sentence, including reduction
below a minimum mandatory sentence, for cooperation and substantial assistance rendered
within one year of sentencing. Id.; 15 F.3d at 1034.
164. 15 F.3d at 1034.
165. Id. at 1035.
166. Id. The First Circuit held there is no statutory authority for a government appeal
of a sentence reduced under FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(b). See United States v. McAndrews, 12
F.3d 273, 277 (1st Cir. 1993).
167. 15 F.3d at 1037.
168. 36 F.3d 1050 (11th Cir. 1994).

SENTENCING GUIDELINES

1995]

1411

tence.'6 9 The court apparently held that the starting point for departures is the base offense level which encompasses the minimum
mandatory sentence, without regard to such Chapter Three adjustments
as acceptance of responsibility or role in the offense."' 0 The court
applied the rule set out in Chavarria-Herrara,"'holding that departures for substantial assistance cannot be based on any factor other than
the defendant's substantial assistance.17 2 The court held that the
appropriate starting point for a substantial assistance departure is the
first base offense level which contains the minimum mandatory and that
the sentencing reduction supposedly must be based only upon the quality
and quantity of the defendant's cooperation.1 73 Other factors such 1as
74
role in the offense and acceptance of responsibility must be ignored.
This result seems absurd and may be founded in the facts of the case
which are not fully recited in a very short opinion.
The guidelines recognize a departure for diminished mental capacity.17 5 There is also a departure based on substantial assistance, but
it requires a motion filed by the government. 7 In United States v.
Munoz-Realpe1 77 the district court attempted to blend the two, finding
that the defendant's diminished mental capacity prevented him from
rendering substantial assistance of a quality or quantity that the
government could reward with the required motion. 7 The district
court departed downward by two levels.1 79 The appellate court rejected
the departure explaining that the diminished capacity departure applies
only to cases where it contributed to the offense itself, not to the
defendant's ability to render substantial assistance afterward." s The
court reaffirmed its position that a substantial assistance departure
can
8
only be made with the government's consent and motion.' '

169. Id. at 1051.

170. Id. at 1052.
171. 15 F.3d 1033.
172. 36 F.3d at 1052. The rule, to this point, applied only to resentencing under FED.
R. CRIM. P. 35. Aponte makes clear that the rule applies to all sentencing departures
based on substantial assistance. Id.
173.

Id.

174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Id.
U.S.S.G. § 5K2.13.
Id. § 5M2.1.
21 F.3d 375 (11th Cir. 1994).
Id. at 379.
Id.
Id. at 380.
Id. at 379-80.
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82 makes clear that interstate
The holding in United States v. Dailey"
travel with intent to carry on the unlawful activity of extortion' is a
crime of violence, and therefore the sentencing court cannot consider a
departure based on diminished capacity pursuant to U.S.S.G. section
5K2.13.1" The court noted a conflict among the circuits and left it
unresolved 85
On the other hand, the court in Dailey found that a departure based
on the victim's provocation is permissible under U.S.S.G. section
8 7 The court also found
5K2.10 l" even though the offense is violent."
that the victim-based departure was reasonable in this case because the
victim had defrauded Dailey and his family of tens of thousands of
dollars.'"
V.

OTHER SENTENCING ISSUES

Naturally, the court addressed important sentencing issues which do
not involve specific guidelines. Stinson v. United States, which stems
from the Eleventh Circuit, serves as one of the most significant Supreme
Court cases regarding the federal sentencing guidelines. 89 In that
case the court held that the commentary to the guidelines is ordinarily
binding.'
Specifically, the court held that the sentencing guidelines
commentary which clarifies that the crime of felon in possession of a
firearm is not a crime of violence is binding and remanded the case to
the Eleventh Circuit for action consistent with that position.' 9 ' The
Eleventh Circuit reluctantly complied.9"
In United States v. Morse,93 the court held that Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 111" does not require the trial court to advise a
defendant that he or she may become ineligible for federal benefits as
the result of a plea. 96 Rule 11 requires district courts to advise
defendants regarding substantial rights but not of all possible collateral

182. 24 F.3d 1323 (11th Cir. 1994).
183. 18 U.S.C. § 1952(aX3) (1988 & Supp. II 1990).
184. 24 F.3d at 1325; U.S.S.G. § 5K2.13.

185. 24 F.3d at 1327.
186. U.S.S.G. § 2K2.10.

187. Id.
188. Id. at 1328.
189. 113 S. Ct. 1913 (1993).

190. Id. at 1915.
191.
192.
193.
194,
195.

Id. at 1920.
United States v. Stinson, 30 F.3d 121 (11th Cir. 1994).
36 F.3d 1070 (11th Cir. 1994).
FED. R. CRIM. P. 11.
36 F.3d at 1072.
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consequences of a plea.'"N Eligibility for federal benefits, like the
possibility of deportation 9 7 and ineligibility for parole,"9 8 is a collateral matter."'
In United States v. Taffe, 200 the defendant pleaded guilty to use of
a firearm during, and in relation to, crimes of violence and drug trafficking, 20 1 among other things. The statute requires an enhanced mandatory sentence of thirty years consecutive to the sentence imposed in the
underlying crime if the defendant used a silencer or other specified
device.'
The gun Taffe carried was an AK-47, itself subject to a five
year mandatory sentence,' 3 but a codefendant carried an Uzi with a
silencer.20 4 One count of the indictment to which Taffe pleaded guilty
named all the weapons used in the offense, including the Uzi,"S and
the Eleventh Circuit held that in entering this plea, "Taffe made a
legally binding admission of responsibility for the use of the silencer
during the course of his offense."20' The court added that, "Taffe
cannot now challenge as improper a sentence that directly reflects the
facts to which he pled guilty."0 7 Note also that a codefendant pleaded
guilty to a different indictment, and the court subjected him to only the
five year mandatory consecutive provision. Taffe raised an equal
protection argument for the first time on appeal.0 8 209The court, finding
no manifest injustice, declined to consider the issue.
In United States v. Hernandez,2 0 the court found error in the district
court's refusal to hold an evidentiary hearing on a motion to reduce
sentence pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35.21" The
defendant's plea agreement obligated the government to bring the
defendant's cooperation to the sentencing court's attention.212 The
government filed a Rule 35 motion asking for a sentence reduction and

196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

Id.
United States v. Campbell, 778 F.2d 764, 767 (11th Cir. 1985).
Holmes v. United States, 876 F.2d 1545, 1548 (11th Cir. 1989).
36 F.3d at 1072.
36 F.3d 1047 (lth Cir. 1994).
Id. at 1048 (in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (Supp. 1994)).
18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (Supp. 1994).
Id.
36 F.3d at 1049.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing United States v. Eaves, 849 F.2d 363, 365 (8th Cir. 1988)).
Id. at 1049 n.3.
Id.
34 F.3d 998 (11th Cir. 1994).
Id. at 1001.
Id. at 1000.
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evidentiary hearing, but for security reasons did not detail the extent or
nature of the defendant's cooperation.2 13 The district court denied the
motion without a hearing, and the defendant appealed.214 The appellate court held that since the government was obligated to inform the
sentencer of the nature and extent of the cooperation, and the motion
itself did not satisfy that obligation, failure to hold a hearing "forced a
breach of the plea agreement." 1
The sentencing scheme which punishes crack cocaine offenses at
approximately one hundred times the rate for powder cocaine once again
2 1 the
survived a constitutional attack. In United States v. Harden,
court held that crack is more addictive and dangerous than powder, and
there is no evidence that either Congress or the Commission enacted the
unequal penalties for a discriminatory purpose. 1
Although the career offender provision of the guidelines imposes limits
on the age of prior convictions used to invoke enhanced sentences,21
the statute enhancing sentences for drug offenses does not.21 9 In
United States v. Hudacek, ° the court held that any prior felony drug
conviction, no matter how old, can qualify for the statutory enhancement. 22'
The preservation of objections to the presentence report and the
impact of U.S.S.G. Chapter Seven (Violations of Probation and Supervised Release) were both addressed in United States v. Milano.222 The
defendant had been convicted of drug offenses and cooperated with the
government.
At the original sentencing hearing, the defendant
abandoned his objections to the presentence report (including the drug
quantity calculation) because it was apparent that he would be
sentenced to probation.2 When the defendant violated his probation
by continuing to sell drugs, his attorney attempted to revive the original
objections.'
The government successfully argued that the previous

213. Id. at 999-1000.
214. Id. at 1000.
215. Id. at 1001.
216.

37 F.3d 595 (11th Cir. 1994).

217. Id. at 602.
218. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(e).

219. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1XA) (Supp. 1994).
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

24 F.3d 143 (11th Cir. 1994).
Id. at 146.
32 F.3d 1499 (11th Cir. 1994).
Id. at 1500.
Id.
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waiver was valid and the objections could not be renewed at the
subsequent revocation proceeding.'
The district court sentenced the defendant to 151 months which was
the bottom of the original guideline range and far above the roughly 50
month sentence called for by Chapter Seven of the guidelines. 226
Chapter Seven is drafted as a series of policy statements which are
intended "to provide guidance" to sentencing courts.'
The Eleventh
Circuit has long held that these policy statements are advisory only and
not binding on district courts. 228 The court addressed the possible
impact that Stinson'rs might have on this position. Although Stinson
holds that policy statements and commentary are binding unless they
violate the Constitution or federal statute, the court distinguished the
Chapter Seven policy statements and maintained that they are strictly
advisory.'
This is the position of the majority of circuits throughout
the country."sl
VI. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
The constitutionality
of a sentencing statute is entitled to de novo
22
review. 3
The application of law to sentencing issues is reviewed de novo while
factual findings are reviewed for clear error.'
Courts must review de novo the application of a particular guideline
to the facts of a case.'
Courts review an enhancement for more than minimal planning for
clear error. 5 (But see below.)
An enhancement for obstruction of justice is a mixed question of law
and fact. Courts review findings of fact for clear error and review the

225.
226.
227.
228.

Id. at 1501.
Id. at 1502.
U.S.S.G. Chapter 7, Part Al.
United States v. Thompson, 976 F.2d 1380, 1381 (11th Cir. 1992).

229.

113 S. Ct. 1913 (1993).

230. 32 F.3d at 1503.
231. See United States v. Anderson, 15 F.3d 278 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v.
Mathena, 23 F.3d 87 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v. Sparks, 19 F.3d 1099 (6th Cir. 1994);
United States Levi, 2 F.3d 842 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v. Forrester, 19 F.3d 482 (9th
Cir. 1994). But see United States v. Lewis, 998 F.2d 497 (7th Cir. 1993).
232. United States v. Harden, 37 F.3d 595 (11th Cir. 1994) (citing United States v.
Osburn, 955 F.2d 1500, 1503 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 290 (1992), and cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 223 (1992)).
233. United States v. Dukovich, 11 F.3d 140, 141 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
2112 (1994).
234. Id.
235. United States v. Scroggins, 880 F.2d 1204, 1215 (11th Cir. 1989).
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However, meaningful

requires carefully articulated findings of fact from the
appellate review
23 7
courts below.

Drug quantities for sentencing purposes must be proven only by a
preponderance of the evidence." 5 The government bears the burden
to establish drug quantities.'ss Courts review for clear error a district
court's determinations regarding drug quantities."
Courts must review for clear error whether drugs have appropriately
been aggregated under the rules of relevant conduct "in considering as
'part of the same course of conduct or part of a common scheme or plan
as the count of conviction' conduct which exists in 'discrete, identifiable
units' apart from the offense of conviction."24
error the determination of a defendant's
Courts review for clear 242
acceptance of responsibility.
The question of whether to reduce a guideline calculation based on the
role in the offense is a determination of fact reviewed
defendant's minor
43
for clear error.

The court should employ a plenary review to a district court's decision
regarding whether a departure is authorized. 2'
There exists a three-part analysis used to review departures. First is
the issue of whether the Commission adequately considered the reason
relied on for the departure in drafting the guidelines.245 Whether the
Commission adequately considered the factor is reviewed de novo.'"
Second, if the Commission did not adequately consider the factor, the
question of whether reliance on the factor is consistent with the goals of

236, United States v. Burton, 933 F.2d 916,917-18 (11th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (citing
United States v. Garcia, 909 F.2d 319, 392 (11th Cir. 1990).
237. United States v. Alpert, 28 F.3d 1104, 1106 (11th Cir. 1994).
238. United States v. Louis, 967 F.2d 1550, 1553 (11th Cir. 1992).
239. United States v. Taffe, 36 F.3d 1047, 1050 (11th Cir. 1994); United States v.
Ismond, 993 F.2d 1498, 1499 (11th Cir. 1993).
240. 36 F.3d at 1050; United States v. Alston, 895 F.2d 1362, 1369 (11th Cir. 1990).
241. United States v. Maxwell, 34 F.3d 1006, 1011 (11th Cir. 1994) (citing Hahn, 960
F.2d at 909-10).
242. United States v. Carroll, 6 F.3d 735, 739, (11th Cir. 1993), cert. denied by Jessee
v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1234 (1994). See also United States v. Anderson, 23 F.3d 368,
369 (11th Cir. 1994).
243. 21 F.3d 375, 380 (11th Cir. 1994).
244. United States v. Costales, 5 F.3d 480,483 (11th Cir. 1993). See also United States
v. Braxton, 19 F.3d 1385, 1386 (11th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 332 (1994).
245. United States v. Mogel, 956 F.2d 1555, 1557 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
167 (1992).
246. United States v. Weaver, 920 F.2d 1570, 1573 (11th Cir. 1991); United States v,
Chotas, 913 F.2d 897, 900 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 950 (1991).
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the guidelines should be reviewed.2 4' Third, if the factor is consistent
with the goals of guidelines sentencing, the reasonableness of the
departure itself is reviewed.24
VII.

CONCLUSION

The sentencing guidelines have taken on a life of their own. Despite
the fact that guideline sentencing issues clog the dockets of the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals, and inmates serving guideline sentences are
flowing into (but not out of) federal prisons, there is no end in sight.
Although 1994 produced the fewest and least drastic amendments ever,
the Commission now operates with a full staff and certainly percieves
the new Republican Congress as an ally.
The Eleventh Circuit, which at times seems to chafe at the restrictions
the guidelines demand,249 often adopts the most restrictive interpretaOn the other hand, the court has
tion of guideline principles.'
rendered several opinions (particularly in drug cases) which may reflect
its displeasure with the strictness and harshness of the sentencing
scheme." 1

247. 956 F.2d at 1557.
248. Id.; 920 F.2d at 1573. See also United States v. Godfrey, 22 F.3d 1048, 1053 (11th
Cir. 1994).
249. See United States v. Stinson, 943 F.2d 1268 (11th Cir. 1991); 957 F.2d 813 (11th
Cir. 1992); 30 F.3d 121 (11th Cir. 1994).
15 F.3d 1033 (11th
250. See Aponte, 36 F.3d 1050 (11th Cir. 1994); Chavarria-Herrara,
Cir. 1994); Dailey, 24 F.3d 1323 (11th Cir. 1994); Taffe, 36 F.3d 1047 (11th Cir. 1994).
251. See Chitty, 15 F.3d 159(11th Cir. 1994); Maxwell, 34 F.3d 1006(11th Cir. 1994);
Munoz-Realpe, 21 F.3d 375 (11th Cir. 1994).

